Does the minimum wage reduce wage inequality? Evidence from Thailand by Leckcivilize, Attakrit
Leckcivilize IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:21 
DOI 10.1186/s40175-015-0041-7
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Does the minimumwage reduce wage
inequality? Evidence from Thailand
Attakrit Leckcivilize
Correspondence:
leckcivilize@aoek.uni-hannover.de
Institute of Labour Economics,
Leibniz University of Hannover,
Königsworther Platz 1, 30167
Hannover, Germany
Abstract
Most of the minimum wage literature in developing countries provides supporting
evidence of its effectiveness in reducing wage inequality. Using minimum wage data
from Thailand (1985–2010), I find rather mixed outcomes. The minimum wage seems
to help compress the lower part of wage distribution for employees in large businesses.
However, the effect does not extend to small and medium firms in the covered sector.
In contrast with its role as a benchmark for wage adjustment in Latin America, the
minimum wage in Thailand does not reduce overall wage inequality owing to the high
non-compliance rate and weak law enforcement, particularly in the informal sector.
JEL classification: J38; O17
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1 Introduction
The effects of minimum wages on various groups of workers have been a popular subject
of vigorous debate in the long history of economic literature, as reviewed by Brown (1999);
Card and Krueger (1995); Machin and Manning (1997); and Neumark and Wascher
(2008). A few of the reasons for the minimum wage policy are its potential to reduce
wage inequality, especially among low-paid workers, and its potential to lift these workers
and their families out of poverty (Saget 2001). Therefore, it is crucial to verify any effects
minimum wages have on wage distributions. Research from the US, UK and Canada in
the 1990s (Card and Krueger 1994; DiNardo et al. 1996; Fortin and Lemieux 2000; Lee
1999; Machin and Manning 1994) found that minimum wages significantly reduce wage
dispersion. Recent studies in these countries find smaller direct and spillover effects of
the minimum wage on the overall wage distribution because minimum wages were set at
the level where only a small fraction of workers were directly affected (Autor et al. 2010;
Dickens and Manning 2004). Hence, it is interesting to investigate the impacts of such
policies in the context of developing countries where minimum wages tend to affect a
larger fraction of workers.
However, the compliance with the minimum wage law in developing countries is far
from perfect and a significant proportion of workers are in the informal sector. So the
expected result is rather ambiguous. Moreover, comparisons across studies in developing
countries are more complicated due to differences in minimum wage levels, enforcement
and labor market institutions (Lemos 2009). Though these studies mostly agree on the
© 2015 Leckcivilize. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
license, and indicate if changes were made.
Leckcivilize IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:21 Page 2 of 23
positive wage compression effect ofminimumwages in the formal sector, the results in the
informal sector are rather mixed (see Maloney and Mendez 2003; Neumark andWascher
2008, for a literature survey).
There are several reasons that the minimumwage can affect the informal wage distribu-
tion in spite of its expected ineffectiveness for informal workers. First, the minimumwage
could induce the relocation of capital from the formal sector to the labor intensive infor-
mal sector, leading to higher informal sector wages (Harrison and Leamer 1997). Maloney
andMendez (2003) also argue that the minimumwage could act as a benchmark for “fair”
remuneration (the so-called ‘lighthouse effect’). Moreover, Khamis (2013) provides evi-
dence from Argentina that employers might comply with the minimum wage law but not
other benefit entitlements such as social security contribution (which is widely used to
classify workers into the formal or informal sector). In addition, Boeri et al. (2010) use the
matching model to show that if the introduction of the minimum wage changes the skill
composition between formal and informal sectors, such sorting of workers by skill could
lead to higher average skills of workers in the informal sector, thus, higher average wages.
Most studies in Latin America and the Caribbean report positive wage compression
effects of the minimum wage in both sectors (with a few exceptions such as Honduras
in Gindling and Terrell 2009). For example, Freeman and Freeman (1992) observe spikes
around the minimum wage in the earning distribution of all Puerto Rican workers
whereas Lemos (2009) finds that the minimum wage in Brazil compresses the wage dis-
tribution of not only the formal and informal sectors but also low-educated workers and
the self-employed. Using kernel-density plots, Maloney et al. (2001) show that minimum
wages could influence the distribution of wages in both the formal and informal sectors
of eight Latin American countries with stronger distortion around the minimum wages
in the informal wage distribution in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay. In case of the
Mexico, Bosch andManacorda (2010) employ a modified version of the Lee (1999) model
and conclude that the minimum wage policy compresses the bottom part of Mexico’s
wage distribution with more pronounced effects in the informal sector (up to the eighth
decile of the informal wage distribution). They also observe a positive correlation between
minimum wages and inequality of sub-minimum wage workers and stronger spillover
effects in the informal sector.
Outside Latin America and the Caribbean, studies on the effects of minimum wages on
wage inequality in other developing countries are less common (for a review of evidence
from developing countries in other regions, see Saget 2001). Despite rising or persistent
wage and income inequality in East and Southeast Asian economies, there is a paucity of
evidence of the minimum wage effects on the wage distribution in this region. The exist-
ing literature focuses on economic liberation or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the
underlying factor of such trends in inequality (Jomo 2006; Te Velde and Morrissey 2004).
The only exception is Indonesia where researchers find conflicting results. Particularly,
Rama (2001) and Suryahadi et al. (2001) show that minimum wage hikes have a positive
impact on average wages of all workers and all segments of the workforce but are mostly
insignificant except for the sub-sample of blue-collar workers. On the contrary, using the
simulation framework, Bird and Manning (2008) report negative effects of the policy on
wages in the informal sector.
With respect to wage inequality in Thailand, similar to the Anglo-Saxon economies,
Lathapipat (2009) finds evidence for wage polarization in Thailand during the late 1980s
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to early 2000s (Table 4.1 in Lathapipat (2008) and Figure five in Lathapipat (2009)). Wage
inequality at the top had risen whereas wage gaps between the median and the first decile
were narrowed down. Lathapipat proposes that the rise of the bottom part of the wage
distribution could result from an internal migration of laborers from hidden unemploy-
ment in rural areas to the modern sector in urban areas. Yet it is interesting to investigate
if other factors such as labor market institutions contribute to such a finding.
The objective of this paper is to assess the role of the minimum wage policy in nar-
rowing the wage gap of low-paid workers in Thailand. Additionally, it contributes to the
small literature on the differential effects of the minimum wage on formal and informal
wage inequality in Southeast Asia. This paper uses the Thai Labor Force Survey (LFS) in
the first and third quarters (dry and rainy seasons) from 1985 to 2010. It exploits varia-
tion in the ‘effective minimum’, which is defined as the difference between the statutory
minimum wage and median wage in each province (Lee 1999), to identify impacts of the
minimum wage on different percentiles of wages in that province. However, Lee’s econo-
metric specifications are subjected to criticisms on omitted variables and division biases.
To circumvent such problems, this paper follows the methodology proposed by Autor
et al. (2010). Particularly, provincial fixed effects and provincial linear trends are included
as well as the statutory minimum wage in each province-year is used as an instrumental
variable for the effective minimum.
The results show no discernible wage compression effect on the overall labor mar-
ket and in sectors obligated to pay the minimum wage (the so-called ‘covered sector’).
In other words, the minimum wage does not result in significant wage compression for
either all employees or workers in the covered sector. However, the evidence suggests
that the minimum wage significantly compresses the wage distribution of workers in
large establishments in the covered sector. To verify whether such a finding is driven
by periods of incremental rises in statutory minimum wage after the 1997 Asian finan-
cial crisis or not, this paper uses the methodology based on “Fraction of Affected
Workers” by Card and Krueger (1995) to assess the effects of the minimum wage
on the wage distribution of periods with significant hikes. Still, the main result is
affirmed.
Thus, the finding of this paper highlights the role of a difference in the compliance rate
between the formal and informal sectors on effectiveness of the minimum wage policy,
provided that firm size can be used to classify workers into either the formal or informal
sector. Although such finding is in contrast to most of the literature from Latin America,
where minimum wages effectively influence both formal and informal wage distribution,
it is in line with the segmented labor market (or two-sector) model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the minimum wage and
its enforcement in Thailand. Then Section 3 presents data and descriptive statistics.
Section 4 outlines the methodology while Section 5 briefly discusses the results. Section 6
presents some robustness checks and Section 7 discusses the results with respect to law
enforcement and economic theories. The conclusion and discussion of future research
are in Section 8.
2 Minimumwage and its enforcement in Thailand
The minimum wage was first introduced for private employees outside the agricultural
sector in Bangkok and adjacent cities in April 1973. Later in October 1974, its coverage
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was expanded to the whole country. The statutory minimum wages have been set differ-
ently across zones as wages in baht per day - which, in general, is defined as eight hours
of work. As for part-time workers, they are also entitled to receive an hourly minimum
wage which is equal to the daily minimum wage divided by eight hours.1
At first, the minimum wage setting process was centralized and categorized into three
zones by geographic region. From October 1981, the legislation stated that minimum
wage setting should take factors of each region - such as inflation, living standard, com-
petitiveness, and economic and labor market condition - into consideration. Although
the national tripartite committee (comprising representatives from employers, employees
and government) raised minimum wages around once a year (except for 1999 and 2000),
the number of minimum wage zones was stable at around three-four zones during 1981–
2001. After the enactment of the Labor Protection Act 1998, the minimum wage setting
was decentralized from the national to regional tripartite sub-committee in each province
or sub-region. Then the number of minimum wage zones started to increase dramatically
from eight zones in 2002 to 28 zones in 2010. Yet differences among provinces broken
away from the same zone are relatively small.
Figure 1 shows the real value of minimum wages in ten selected provinces including
Bangkok and Phuket as well as the two provinces from the north, Phrae and Phayao, which
are among the top two and bottom two of the minimum wage zones in 2010. Real mini-
mumwages rose from the late 1980s until they reached their peak slightly before the 1997
Asian economic crisis. Then they dropped sharply and did not attain such levels again
even in 2011.
Since its first implementation, violation of the law could result in being fined, impris-
oned, or both. For example, the Labor Protection Act 1998 states that any employers
paying wages lower than the legislative minimum are liable for a fine not exceeding
100,000 baht or up to six-month imprisonment or both. Based on minimum wages in
2001, the upper limit of this fine is worth more than 600 worker-days for every province,
which is a sizable punishment for small and medium firms.
Fig. 1 The real minimum wages of selected provinces (Baht per day in 2007) 1981–2011. Note: To acquire
the real value, nominal minimum wages in each province are adjusted by Consumer Price Index (CPI) at the
regional level
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However, the effectiveness of the law enforcement is questionable. According to Table 1,
although the labor inspection rate during 2006–2010 was 12–13% of all establishments
each year, more than 94% of firms violating any labor law received only a warning from
the authority. Less than 0.3% of all wrong-doing establishments were fined or prosecuted.
Although the non-compliance rate had been decreasing overtime from 4.7% in 2006
(2,100 out of 44,658 establishments) to 1.26% in 2010 (625 out of 49,463 establishments),
weak law enforcement in the earlier periods could contribute to either no effect on wage
inequality or differential effects across different sectors. I will return to the consequences
of weak law enforcement later.
3 Data and descriptive analysis
I employ the Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted by the National Statistics Office
of Thailand (NSO). NSO adopts a stratified two-stage sampling technique for the
whole country (starting with blocks or villages and then private households) for these
surveys. From 1984 to 1997 the surveys were conducted in three rounds in each
year. The first round enumeration was held in February, coinciding with the non-
agricultural season; the second round was normally held in May when the new labor
force of graduated students had just finished their studies; and the third round was
conducted in August, during the agricultural season. From 1998 to 2000, the fourth
round of the survey was conducted in November (NSO 2003). Since 2001 the sur-
veys have been conducted monthly, with three months combined for each round of
surveys.
LFS provides data on individual characteristics for every member of the household
including work status, occupation, industry and hours worked for all employed persons.
Also, for all wage earners, the LFS records information on wage/salary, overtime pay-
ments, bonuses and some other fringe benefits in the first and third rounds. After 1999
this wage data also has been available for the second and fourth rounds. In order to ensure
comparability across years, only the first and third rounds (dry and rainy seasons) of the
LFS from 1985 to 2010 (with the exception of three rounds, which are 1986 1st , 1990 1st ,
and 2010 3rd) are utilized. Typically, the sample size of each survey is large and repre-
sentative at regional level. Only after February 1994 did NSO expand the sample size to
assure statistical representation at provincial level (NESDB and NSO 2004).2 Hence, due
to the small sample size in these early surveys (especially for wage earners), this study will
provide a robustness check where provinces and rounds with too few observations are
dropped.
In this paper, the sample covers all wage earners in private, public and state enter-
prises who report their wages and the number of hours worked in the week preceding
the survey. As the minimum wage law in Thailand primarily determines the basic wage
for regular working hours – hourly wages excluding other compensation such as bonuses,
over-time, clothes or any other benefits – these are used. Hourly wages are calculated
from basic wage divided by total hours worked for principal occupation. In several
cases, the total hours worked may contain hours of over time work. Since employers
are required by law to pay over-time at a rate that is at least 50% higher than hourly
wages during regular hours, I compare information on basic wage with over time pay-
ment adjusted by 1.5 in order to obtain the proportion of regular hours worked from
the number of total hours worked. Although this procedure might overestimate the
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Table 1 Labor inspection in the whole country 2006–2010 (number of establishments)
Year
Establishments inspected Non-compliance with labor law Conduction of labor inspector
Number Percentage
All types of Minimum wage Warning
Summon
Order of
Fine
Criminal action
illegal conduct Est. Persons issued compliance submission
2006 44,658 11.89 7,982 2,100 7,730 7,570 251 145 6 10
2007 50,993 13.37 7,725 2,005 6,752 7,300 329 76 11 9
2008 47,940 12.54 5,667 1,287 4,018 5,509 118 38 2 -
2009 50,669 12.99 5,150 880 4,137 4,946 119 76 2 7
2010 49,463 12.49 2,447 625 4,033 2,366 50 26 1 4
Source : Labor Standard Development Bureau, Department of Labor Protection and Welfare
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number of regular hours worked, it should provide a lower bound for the observed hourly
wage.
According to the kernel density of log hourly wages in Fig. 2 where two vertical
lines refer to minimum wages in each zone during July 2007 and 2008 respectively,
male workers seem to earn slightly more than their female counterparts in all zones,
as expected. Nevertheless, there is no distinct spike around the minimum wage in
any zones. In Bangkok and the central region, peaks of female wage distributions
are only slightly higher than the statutory minimum; on the contrary just around
half of female workers in the north receive basic hourly wages that are higher than
the minimum wages in their provinces. This result indicates a possibility of a severe
non-compliance problem in many provinces, especially in the low minimum wage
zones.
In Table 2, binding percentiles – fractions of employees in each province who receive
wages less than the legislative minimum wage – of the minimum wage across provinces
over the sample periods are presented. Though it does not show a clear upward trend
in the rate of compliance with the minimum wage law, binding percentiles in provinces
with the highest, middle, and lowest rates of non-compliance (referred in Table 2 as Max,
Median, and Min pctile) decrease slightly over the period of study. Still, non-compliance
rates in provinces in around half of the country were higher than 30% even in 2009.
Consequently, the wage compression effect from minimum wage laws might be par-
tially effective. Various strategies to investigate this hypothesis will be discussed in the
following section.
Fig. 2 The kernel density of log hourly wage (weighted) for all workers July 2007 VS 2008 in selected
provinces. 1) BKK stands for Bangkok. 2) North includes two provinces in the north of Thailand which are
among the lowest pay scale of minimum wage. 3) Central comprises of two provinces in the central with
many industrial estates
Leckcivilize IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:21 Page 8 of 23
Table 2 Bindingness of the provincial minimum wages
All Female Male
Max. Min. Median Max. Min. Median Max. Min. Median
Year(Q3) pctile pctile pctile pctile pctile pctile pctile pctile pctile
1989 85.1 15.5 48.5 95.1 27.4 61.4 80.6 5.0 39.8
1994 72.2 14.2 48.9 85.1 17.6 61.0 62.4 11.2 43.1
1999 62.4 7.5 35.4 75.5 9.6 42.1 59.3 5.8 30.5
2004 65.2 10.8 40.9 74.8 12.4 44.5 62.3 9.4 37.1
2009 51.4 9.5 29.9 62.1 8.4 34.8 53.2 7.6 26.2
The definition for Max. pctile, Min. pctile and Median pctile are as follows: All percentiles (pctile) display in this table are a
proportion of workers who received basic wage less than their provincial minimum wage. For Max. pctile, it is such percentile in a
province with the highest level of non-compliance to the law in each year. Meanwhile, Min. pctile is a percentile in a province
with the highest compliance to the law whereas Median pctile is the percentile in a province with non-compliance rates at the
middle of all provinces in that year
4 Methodology
This paper follows the empirical strategy used in the US literature by Lee (1999) as well
as modifications suggested by Autor et al. (2010) to assess the effect of changes in the
minimum wage on wage inequality in Thailand. Lee (1999) assumes that the level of wage
inequality in state n (province n in this paper) at time t depends on the level of latent
wage inequality (the one that would prevail if there was no minimum wage law) and the
minimum wage. Therefore, the position of the minimum wage on the overall distribution
of wages in that region (or its binding percentile) will determine the effect of theminimum
wage on wage inequality. However, since the latent wage inequality is unobservable, the
true bindingness (the position of the minimum wage on the wage distribution which is
unaffected by the minimum wage) is also unmeasurable. So Lee (1999) proposes using
the difference between the log median wage and the log of the statutory minimum wage
in that region as a proxy for the bindingness; he then calls this difference the effective
minimum.
If the key identifying assumption in Lee (1999) – that the cross-regional variation in
latent wage inequality is uncorrelated with themedian – holds, the coefficient of the effec-
tiveminimum can be estimated consistently after controlling for time dummies. However,
Autor et al. (2010) shows that in the US data, the levels of latent wage inequality are
positively correlated with states’ median wages. Therefore, to address omitted variables
resulting from this correlation, state fixed effects should be included. In addition, recent
studies such as Allegretto et al. (2010) provide evidence that state and time dummies can-
not fully account for heterogeneity in underlying employment patterns in low-wage jobs.
Hence, the regression model should also control for state-specific linear trends.
By including both provincial fixed effects and provincial linear trends like in Autor et al.
(2010), this paper allows for the correlation between provincial latent wage inequality and
its median as well as the possibility that changes in minimum wages could correlate with
shocks to the wage distribution in each province. Thus, the main ordinary least squares
(OLS) specification is:
wPnt−wMnt = dtP+dnP+dnP×T+βP1
(
MWnt − wMnt
)+βP2 (MWnt − wMnt)2+Pnt (4.1)
where wPnt is the Pth percentile of the observed log wage (per hour), wMnt is the Median
(this paper uses the 6th decile) of the observed log wage; dtP is the year dummy; dnP is
the provincial dummy; T is the time trend; MWnt is the statutory minimum wage; and
Pnt is an error term in province n at time t for the Pth percentile. Also, all regressions are
weighted by multiplication of sampling weight and number of total hours worked.
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Moreover, to tackle division bias,3 I follow a two-stage least squares (2SLS) strategy as
in Card et al. (1993) and Autor et al. (2010) by using the effective minimum with statu-
tory minimum wage in each province and year as an instrument. This instrument should
be correlated to the provincial effective minimum but uncorrelated to any measurement
errors in the sampling median. Thus, it relies on a key assumption that legislated changes
inminimumwage are not correlated with changes in latent province wage inequality, con-
ditional on year and province dummies and provincial trends. Therefore, the second stage
is the same as in Eq. 4.1 while the first stage for the effective minimum is specified as:
(
MWnt − wMnt
) = dtP + dnP + dnP × T + δPMWnt + νPnt (4.2)
Likewise, an instrument for the square of the effective minimum is computed from the
predicted value from regression 4.2 squared. Yet this instrumentmight suffer from limited
variation because there were few minimum wage zones before 2002. To bypass this prob-
lem and provide robustness checks for the 2SLS models, I adopt a reduced form approach
from Autor et al. (2010) and use predicted instead of observed provincial median wage in
Eq. 4.1. The predicted median can be estimated as follows:
wMnt = dt + dn + dn × T + unt (4.3)
which specifies the provincial median wage, ŵMnt ,as a function of year dummies, province
dummies and provincial trends. Then I define the reduced form effective minimum m˜wnt
as
(
MWnt − ŵMnt
)
. Equation 4.1 can be rewritten as:
wPnt − wPnt−1 = dtP + dnP + dnP × T + β˜P1 m˜wnt + β˜P2 m˜w2nt + ˜Pnt (4.4)
Further, the other identification strategy proposed in the literature called “fraction
affected” (Card and Krueger 1995) is adopted so as to circumvent the potential weak
instruments problem as well as a decline of the real minimum wage. The primary OLS
model is specified as:
wPnt − wPnt−1 = cP + θP(FAnt) + ηPnt (4.5)
where wPnt − wPnt−1 is the change in log hourly wage at the Pth percentile from year t-1
to t in province n; FAnt is the fraction affected in province n in year t, defined as the
fraction of workers in year t-1 who earn wages between the old and newminimumwages,
i.e. between year t-1 and t; cP is a constant; and ηPnt is an error term. In order to control
for different labor market conditions across provinces, regressions which include average
provincial wages in year t-1 as a control are also presented.
Nevertheless, this technique relies on an assumption that workers directly affected by
the increase in the minimum wage are those receiving wages either exactly at the former
minimum wage or between the former and new minimum wages. Therefore, provinces
with a higher fraction affected should show a larger effect on the lower part of wage dis-
tribution. I will present results only from selected years with a substantial increase in
statutory minimumwages which in turn leads to potentially more variation in the fraction
affected.
5 Results
To investigate the effect of minimum wages on wage inequality in developing countries,
the compliance rate is one of the major concerns. Although employers in formal sectors
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are expected to comply with the minimum wage law, the LFS does not provide any infor-
mation on the social security contribution of each worker which is widely used in the
literature as an indication of being a formal worker. Instead, based on characteristics of
workers and firms, this paper computes the non-compliance rate of each sub-group in the
sample implicitly from the percentage of workers paid below the minimum wage.
Therefore, the results demonstrated in this section are classified into three groups
according to coverage of the law and the compliance rate. Aiming to estimate the effect
of the minimum wage on the overall wage distribution, the first group uses all employ-
ees in the sample regardless of their age, gender, or industry. The second group, however,
focuses on male employees in private firms outside the agricultural sector. And thirdly, to
capture the effectiveness of the minimum wage policy on wage inequality in the formal
sector of the Thai labor market (as classified by firm size), the sample is further restricted
to male employees in large private firms.4
Models 4.1 and 4.4 are employed to estimate the regression results in Tables 3, 4 and 5
for all three classifications of the sample respectively. The OLS regressions of all workers
both with and without provincial trends yield positive and significant coefficients in all
percentiles. These results coincide with the criticism about the division bias highlighted in
Autor et al. (2010).5 The next two columns show the results after instrumenting the effec-
tive minimum and its squared term with the legislative minimum wage and the square
of the predicted value from Eq. 4.2. The marginal effects of the 2SLS regressions without
Table 3 Effect of the minimumwage on log wage gap (log(pth) - log(p60)) of selected percentiles, all
workers (1985–2010)
Percentile
OLS 2SLS Predicted median
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 0.72*** 0.585*** 3.973*** –0.815 1.256*** –1.041
(0.082) (0.042) (1.003) (0.622) (0.401) (0.669)
10 0.654*** 0.578*** 2.669*** –0.308 0.956*** –0.395
(0.059) (0.035) (0.67) (0.404) (0.255) (0.483)
20 0.537*** 0.55*** 0.622*** –0.304 0.462*** –0.389
(0.031) (0.031) (0.214) (0.387) (0.08) (0.442)
25 0.489*** 0.524*** 0.154 –0.093 0.334*** –0.119
(0.029) (0.026) (0.235) (0.322) (0.084) (0.404)
30 0.433*** 0.481*** –0.128 –0.031 0.225*** –0.04
(0.03) (0.025) (0.224) (0.257) (0.082) (0.333)
40 0.319*** 0.367*** –0.252 0.093 0.118* 0.119
(0.027) (0.022) (0.157) (0.153) (0.068) (0.217)
75 0.008 –0.015 0.502** -0.08 0.113 –0.102
(0.034) (0.028) (0.207) (0.198) (0.078) (0.264)
90 0.293*** 0.254*** 0.915** 0.152 0.471*** 0.191
(0.058) (0.046) (0.407) (0.36) (0.171) (0.488)
95 0.525*** 0.495*** 0.4 0.128 0.657*** 0.162
(0.05) (0.041) (0.443) (0.382) (0.164) (0.518)
F-test (weak IV) 30.923 17.996
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: These coefficients are marginal effect calculated from linear and square terms of the effective minimum. Standard errors are
clustered at provincial level and displayed in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1% , 5% and 10% level
respectively. Model (1) controls for time and province fixed effect while model (2) also controls for provincial trend
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Table 4 Effect of the minimum wage on log wage gap, sub-sample male private employees outside
the agricultural sector (1985–2010)
Percentile
Adult workers Young workers
2SLS Predicted median 2SLS Predicted median
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 5.122 –0.912 –0.118 –1.178* 1.41** –1.204* 0.731*** –1.661**
(3.556) (0.608) (0.198) (0.647) (0.601) (0.628) (0.264) (0.828)
10 0.787 –0.79 –0.055 –1.02** 1.011*** –0.696 0.433** –0.965
(1.234) (0.507) (0.141) (0.493) (0.361) (0.477) (0.186) (0.655)
20 –0.655 –0.293 0.071 –0.376 0.108 –0.348 0.219* –0.487
(0.852) (0.301) (0.089) (0.34) (0.235) (0.401) (0.13) (0.534)
25 –0.902 –0.227 0.066 –0.291 –0.005 –0.325 0.172 –0.456
(0.893) (0.264) (0.091) (0.308) (0.217) (0.318) (0.118) (0.41)
30 –1.454 –0.209 0.092 –0.269 –0.035 –0.197 0.203** –0.276
(1.227) (0.269) (0.094) (0.322) (0.195) (0.267) (0.092) (0.356)
40 –1.111 –0.058 0.111 –0.073 –0.245* –0.041 0.144** –0.05
(0.96) (0.211) (0.068) (0.27) (0.146) (0.191) (0.067) (0.267)
75 1.944 –0.331** –0.086 –0.425* –0.094 –0.334* –0.012 –0.467*
(1.521) (0.149) (0.094) (0.256) (0.102) (0.191) (0.066) (0.25)
90 4.99 –0.411 –0.196 –0.533 0.063 –0.673 0.144 –0.95
(3.832) (0.361) (0.243) (0.51) (0.234) (0.475) (0.14) (0.64)
95 4.918 –0.733 –0.173 –0.942* 0.238 –1.173* 0.268 –1.606**
(3.743) (0.456) (0.306) (0.566) (0.332) (0.68) (0.221) (0.795)
F-test (weak IV) 2.565 18.458 21.023 9.807
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1% , 5% and 10% level respectively
provincial trends (model (1)) – estimating from coefficients of the effective minimum and
its squared term – are positive and significant in some percentiles. However, the results
of 2SLS regressions with provincial trends are not significantly different from zero in any
percentiles. Such a pattern indicates that the 2SLS estimations are not robust to the exclu-
sion of provincial trends and hence, the regressions with provincial trends are preferable,
owing to the potential correlation between changes in minimum wages and shocks to the
wage distribution discussed earlier. Lastly, the regressions based on the predicted median
with and without provincial trends as in Eq. 4.4 do confirm a pattern of results observed
from the 2SLS.6 In particular, the minimum wage does not have any significant effects on
wage inequality of all workers after taking provincial trends into account.
Table 4 presents the regression results of two different age groups from the sub-sample
of male private employees outside agriculture. According to the legislation, the minimum
wage applies to all workers, both part-time and full-time, in private companies outside
the agricultural sector. However, the reason for choosing only the males instead of both
genders is the higher prevalence of non-compliance among female laborers. So the results
from this male sub-sample should provide an upper bound for the impact of the mini-
mumwage policy in the so-called “covered sector”. The 2SLS regressions of both adult and
young workers do not show significant results in almost all percentiles. The only excep-
tion in the model with provincial trends are the 75th percentile (for both age groups) and
95th percentile (for the young) where minimum wage seems to compress workers’ wage
Leckcivilize IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:21 Page 12 of 23
Table 5 Effect of the minimum wage on log wage gap, sub-sample private employees age 25–54 in
large firms outside the agricultural sector (1987Q3 – 2010Q1)1
Percentile
All workers Only male workers
2SLS Predicted median 2SLS Predicted median
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 –0.378 0.729* 0.083 1.337 0.551 0.519* 0.33 1.354
(1.013) (0.375) (0.262) (0.839) (0.694) (0.28) (0.215) (0.833)
10 –1.25 0.499* 0.239 0.927 0.174 0.543** 0.281 1.418**
(1.603) (0.283) (0.212) (0.676) (0.652) (0.22) (0.196) (0.603)
20 –0.688 0.63** 0.404*** 1.165** 0.443 0.352** 0.23 0.92*
(1.073) (0.247) (0.113) (0.59) (0.462) (0.149) (0.167) (0.513)
25 –0.478 0.649*** 0.374*** 1.192** 0.516 0.415*** 0.282** 1.084**
(0.913) (0.209) (0.094) (0.508) (0.377) (0.129) (0.118) (0.462)
30 –0.305 0.63*** 0.363*** 1.158*** 0.489 0.412*** 0.274*** 1.074**
(0.719) (0.192) (0.083) (0.403) (0.312) (0.124) (0.09) (0.432)
40 0.214 0.478*** 0.238*** 0.879*** 0.468 0.433*** 0.157** 1.128***
(0.354) (0.166) (0.058) (0.314) (0.333) (0.096) (0.07) (0.28)
75 0.096 –0.373 –0.037 –0.671* 0.474 0.218 0.014 0.571
(0.353) (0.242) (0.071) (0.374) (0.394) (0.171) (0.068) (0.436)
90 0.695 –0.037 0.296** –0.059 0.042 0.098 0.121 0.258
(0.877) (0.382) (0.146) (0.714) (0.528) (0.3) (0.155) (0.816)
95 –0.205 0.465 0.405** 0.842 –1.004 –0.032 0.194 –0.088
(0.909) (0.519) (0.174) (1.01) (0.952) (0.562) (0.196) (1.535)
F-test (weak IV) 2.408 8.942 3.494 10.884
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1% , 5% and 10% level respectively. 1This sample
does not include both quarters of 2001 due to a change in definition of a variable “firm size” in that year
in these percentiles towards the median (60th percentile). Moreover, the results from pre-
dicted median method with provincial trends show similar patterns of significance (at the
75th and 95th percentiles), with two additional negative coefficients at the bottom (the 5th
and 10th percentiles for the adults and only the 5th percentile for the young). It can be
interpreted that the minimum wage might result in widening the wage gap between the
median workers and the low-wage workers in this sub-sample, though the significance
and direction of the results are not robust to an exclusion of provincial trends.
Lastly, we consider the sub-sample of adult workers in large private firms (with more
than 100 workers) outside the agricultural sector. Since this group has the lowest percent-
age of sub-minimum wage workers among all three classifications, it is used to represent
the “formal sector” of the Thai labor market. Table 5 illustrates that, after controlling
for provincial trends, the minimum wage policy narrows the wage gap from the 20th to
40th percentiles and the median (60th percentile) regardless of gender7 or model speci-
fications (2SLS8 or predicted median). This result implies that female workers in large
firms who normally receive lower wages than males also benefit from the policy. Further,
the coefficients from regressions with provincial trends comply with the model’s under-
lying assumption that the minimum wage should not affect the upper side of the wage
distribution.
In sum, the minimum wage policy seems to have different impacts on wage inequal-
ity depending on segments of the labor market. Only low-paid workers in large private
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firms (which can be considered as the formal segment of labor market) benefit from such
wage compression effect. However, workers in the lowest wage percentile (5th) in this sub-
group still do not benefit from the policy (the marginal effects are significant at the 10%
significance level only in the 2SLS model). Thus, non-compliance seems to be one of the
important factors contributing to the failure to reduce wage inequality in both the formal
and informal sectors through the minimum wage policy.
Yet the real minimum wage was eroded for more than a decade after the Asian financial
crisis in 1997. This could be another factor contributing to such widened wage gaps. Using
the LFS data in the third quarter of 1994/95 and 1996/97, this paper adopts an empiri-
cal strategy based on the fraction of workers affected by the minimum wage (Card and
Krueger 1995) in order to assess the importance of this concern. These periods are cho-
sen because they are the last two periods of sizable increase in minimumwages before the
Asian financial crisis (around 8.6–9.8% rise for every province in July 1995 and 8.2–8.7%
in October 1996 relative to July 1994 and 1996 respectively). Furthermore, descriptive
statistics in Tables 6 and 7 show that the characteristics of every sub-group of workers
(which are sub-minimumwage workers, directly affected workers and other workers with
higher wages) in 1994-such as gender, age, average years of education and firm size-are
roughly similar to those in 1996.
Tables 8 and 9 classify workers into three sub-groups as discussed earlier. To get com-
parable results between these sub-groups, I employ the data only in 32 provinces with
sizable samples during these periods. Overall, there are very few percentiles with signif-
icant results at the 5% level. While the minimum wage increase in July 1995 results in
negative and significant effects on changes in wages of the 25th and 30th percentiles of
sub-sample male private employees and large firm employees respectively,9 these
results are not significant in the regressions without the average provincial wage as a
control variable. Conversely, the minimum wage rise in October 1996 has a positive and
significant effect on wage changes between 1997 and 1996 in the 30th percentile of the
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of all employees in the LFS 1994 sample
LFS 1994
Below Min Between Min Between Min Above Min
Wage 93 Wage 94/93 Wage 95/94 Wage 95
Female
0.516 0.356 0.462 0.338
(0.4998) (0.479) (0.4987) (0.4732)
Age
30.443 29.370 27.755 34.102
(12.0203) (10.1998) (8.8799) (9.9641)
Urban
0.322 0.384 0.440 0.592
(0.4673) (0.4867) (0.4965) (0.4915)
Year of education
5.205 6.237 6.783 10.091
(2.4708) (2.8967) (2.9868) (4.821)
Log hourly wage
2.172 2.668 2.765 3.512
(0.4041) (0.128) (0.139) (0.6039)
Working hours per week
54.635 52.447 49.799 44.288
(12.4123) (10.8359) (7.907) (9.6329)
Firm size fewer than 10 ppl
0.577 0.388 0.186 0.192
(0.494) (0.4875) (0.3893) (0.3939)
Firm size more than 100 ppl
0.086 0.194 0.428 0.182
(0.2806) (0.3959) (0.4949) (0.3862)
Obs (weighted) 4,401,933 307,065 792,427 5,426,519
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics of all employees in the LFS 1996 sample
LFS 1996
Below Min Between Min Between Min Above Min
Wage 94 Wage 96/94 Wage 97/96 Wage 97
Female
0.520 0.468 0.477 0.331
(0.4996) (0.4991) (0.4995) (0.4707)
Age
31.889 30.720 29.148 34.020
(12.9363) (10.8289) (10.2624) (10.2763)
Urban
0.313 0.379 0.418 0.546
(0.4638) (0.4852) (0.4933) (0.4979)
Year of education
5.080 5.817 6.081 9.454
(2.5717) (2.7148) (2.6229) (4.7432)
Log hourly wage
2.327 2.720 2.828 3.559
(0.3617) (0.1107) (0.1359) (0.6093)
Working hours per week
55.846 53.451 50.351 45.785
(12.8271) (12.0062) (8.0229) (9.7505)
Firm size less than 10 ppl
0.596 0.385 0.251 0.223
(0.4908) (0.4868) (0.4335) (0.4164)
Firm size more than 100 ppl
0.098 0.159 0.422 0.208
(0.2976) (0.3662) (0.494) (0.4059)
Obs (weighted) 3,465,337 498,048 1,172,664 6,646,047
sub-sample of private employees outside the agricultural sector regardless of firm size.
This result is still robust after controlling for the average provincial wage in the third
quarter of 1996. Interestingly, with negative and significant coefficients in the 5th and 10th
percentiles of all workers, the minimum wage hike in 1996 might have adversely affected
the low-wage workers in the economy-wide wage distribution.
Table 8 Effect of the minimum wage on changes in log wages of different sub-samples from 3rd
quarter 1994 to 1995
Percentile
All workers Male private employees Large firms employees
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 –0.375 –0.389 0.880 –0.711 –0.320 –0.692
(0.644) (0.514) (1.076) (0.664) (0.456) (0.486)
10 0.111 0.102 –0.00874 –0.499 0.295 –0.434
(0.463) (0.371) (0.399) (0.318) (0.465) (0.413)
20 –0.386 –0.394 –0.0143 –0.524 0.609 –0.178
(0.357) (0.301) (0.468) (0.390) (0.419) (0.344)
25 –0.409 –0.416* –0.192 –0.544** 0.791** –0.0609
(0.274) (0.219) (0.243) (0.258) (0.386) (0.240)
30 –0.378 –0.389 0.109 –0.259 0.457 –0.312**
(0.417) (0.276) (0.287) (0.224) (0.296) (0.145)
40 –0.217 –0.228 0.0411 –0.335 0.442 –0.207
(0.389) (0.258) (0.304) (0.265) (0.372) (0.188)
50 0.187 0.174 0.607 0.0254 0.232 –0.203
(0.366) (0.233) (0.409) (0.211) (0.258) (0.186)
75 0.0638 0.0580 –0.413** –0.530*** 0.121 –0.394
(0.529) (0.549) (0.184) (0.180) (0.369) (0.323)
90 0.438 0.433 0.724 0.109 0.258 –0.462
(0.704) (0.729) (0.496) (0.472) (0.381) (0.392)
95 –0.0351 –0.0402 –0.268 –0.831 0.575 –0.105
(0.512) (0.532) (0.822) (0.882) (0.573) (0.628)
Average wage No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
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Table 9 Effect of the minimum wage on changes in log wages of different sub-samples from 3rd
quarter 1996 to 1997
Percentile
All workers Male private employees Large firms employees
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 –0.833** –0.829** –0.790 –1.120* –0.575 –0.267
(0.307) (0.308) (0.477) (0.636) (0.578) (0.603)
10 –0.732** –0.754** 0.0343 –0.170 –0.914* –0.763
(0.304) (0.324) (0.240) (0.309) (0.493) (0.548)
20 –0.163 –0.151 0.856** 0.749* 0.289 0.247
(0.341) (0.322) (0.324) (0.376) (0.189) (0.214)
25 –0.0793 –0.0671 0.621** 0.455 0.231 0.342
(0.372) (0.354) (0.270) (0.272) (0.209) (0.206)
30 –0.274 –0.280 0.610*** 0.489** 0.395** 0.591***
(0.297) (0.305) (0.205) (0.200) (0.170) (0.172)
40 –0.384 –0.386 –0.637 –0.235 0.0170 0.440*
(0.266) (0.279) (0.705) (0.459) (0.290) (0.240)
50 –0.413 –0.484 –0.820 –0.515 –0.399 0.0953
(0.395) (0.374) (0.599) (0.449) (0.457) (0.364)
75 –0.274 –0.435 –1.314 –0.891 –0.445 –0.451
(0.515) (0.497) (0.966) (0.630) (0.384) (0.448)
90 –0.490 –0.642 –2.154 –1.733 –0.597 –0.959
(0.893) (0.865) (1.476) (1.023) (0.468) (0.583)
95 –1.340 –1.432 –3.977* –3.577* –0.853 –1.307
(0.882) (0.861) (2.220) (1.783) (1.080) (1.099)
Average wage No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1% , 5% and 10% level respectively
Although these tables portray conflicting results, the timing of the increase in mini-
mumwage could be an explanation for this discrepancy. In particular, the minimumwage
hike on July 1st , 1995 is right at the beginning of the third quarter in 1995, whereas the
rise in October 1st , 1996 is nine months before the third quarter of 1997. So it seems
that the wage compression effect of the minimum wage depends on not only the market
segmentation but also a time lag so that ‘law-abiding’ employers can change their wage
accordingly. Nevertheless, the result from 1996/97 supports the claim that only the work-
ers around the second and third deciles (in private firms outside the agricultural sector)
receive higher wages as a result of the minimum wage policy.
After considering results from both methods, it can be concluded that the minimum
wage does have very limited effects on wage inequality. Only employees in large private
companies outside agriculture benefit from the wage compression effect. Yet within such
a sub-group, workers with the lowest wage per hour still do not gain from the minimum
wage law. Moreover, the series of incremental increases in minimum wages, especially
after the Asian financial crisis, do not seem to be an important factor underlying such
results. Thus, the ineffectiveness of law enforcement seems to be the most plausible
explanation. The discussion section will address this argument in detail.
6 Robustness checks
One of the major concerns of using LFS data to analyze the wage inequality at the provin-
cial level is the sample size for wage earners in each province. Moreover, the classification
of samples into smaller sub-groups threatens the validity of observed percentiles of wages
due to the smaller sample available for percentile calculation. To address this concern, I
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restrict the sample to those 32 provinces (the same as in Tables 8 and 9) which consistently
have more than ten respondents in all three categories for any survey waves from 1994Q1
to 2010Q1. With the same number of province-quarters in all sub-groups, models 4.1
and 4.4 are re-estimated.
Regressions based on this restricted sample provide supporting evidence for the results
in previous section. After controlling for provincial trends, changes in minimum wages
do not have any significant effects (at the 5% level) on wage distribution of all wage earn-
ers or adult male private employees outside agriculture (for brevity, the regression results
are not shown but are available upon request). Therefore, the ineffectiveness of minimum
wage policy in reducing wage inequality for the whole labor market, or even among eli-
gible workers, is robustly pronounced. Hence, an exclusion of provinces with too small
sample in some periods does not seem to alter the main result.
Tables 10 and 11 illustrates the effects of the minimumwage on wage gaps among work-
ers in the ‘formal’ segment (large firms) and the ‘informal’ segment (small and medium
firms) of the labormarket. There is virtually no effect on the low-paid workers in the infor-
mal sector whereas after controlling for provincial trends in both model specifications,
all percentiles in the lower part of the wage distribution (5th – 40th) experience posi-
tive and significant wage compression pressures towards the median. This result leads
to a slightly different conclusion that, instead of just the 20th – 40th percentiles, the
whole lower part of the wage distribution is pushed closer to the median wage due to
the minimum wage policy. This minor discrepancy could originate from the inclusion of
Table 10 Effect of the minimum wage on log wage gap, sub-sample private employees age 25–54
in large firms outside the agricultural sector in 32 provinces (1994–2010)1
Percentile
OLS 2SLS Predicted median
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 0.728*** 0.776*** –0.23 1.603*** 0.458** 1.881*
(0.063) (0.059) (0.672) (0.609) (0.222) (0.98)
10 0.718*** 0.745*** –0.482 1.084*** 0.558*** 1.268**
(0.04) (0.041) (0.826) (0.266) (0.127) (0.569)
20 0.653*** 0.673*** 0.339 0.919*** 0.532*** 1.072**
(0.031) (0.037) (0.339) (0.316) (0.077) (0.475)
25 0.592*** 0.613*** 0.459 1.072*** 0.48*** 1.257***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.285) (0.337) (0.08) (0.438)
30 0.531*** 0.551*** 0.51** 1.076*** 0.425*** 1.261***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.221) (0.395) (0.067) (0.36)
40 0.413*** 0.432*** 0.553** 0.915** 0.308*** 1.072***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.225) (0.358) (0.056) (0.325)
75 0.03 0.043* –0.145 –0.594 –0.073 –0.705
(0.019) (0.024) (0.209) (0.48) (0.103) (0.5)
90 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.852 0.291 0.263 0.336
(0.055) (0.054) (0.731) (0.649) (0.227) (0.868)
95 0.288*** 0.292*** 0.429 1.422 0.307 1.675
(0.072) (0.067) (0.727) (1.33) (0.308) (1.594)
F-test (weak IV) 1.749 2.535
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1% , 5% and 10% level respectively. 1This sample
does not include both quarters of 2001 due to a change in definition of a variable “firm size” in that year
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Table 11 Effect of the minimum wage on log wage gap, sub-sample private employees age 25–54
in small and medium firms outside the agricultural sector in 32 provinces (1994 – 2010)1
Percentile
OLS 2SLS Predicted median
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
5 0.364*** 0.426*** 8.731 –0.073 –0.163 –0.056
(0.108) (0.118) (7.926) (1.707) (0.5) (1.332)
10 0.432*** 0.496*** 5.429 –0.956 –0.182 –0.702
(0.102) (0.101) (5.202) (1.576) (0.339) (1.067)
20 0.449*** 0.5*** 0.835 –0.045 0 –0.025
(0.064) (0.062) (1.657) (0.738) (0.201) (0.573)
25 0.468*** 0.523*** –0.117 –0.438 –0.049 –0.315
(0.054) (0.054) (1.251) (0.798) (0.182) (0.531)
30 0.406*** 0.454*** –0.625 –0.221 –0.031 –0.167
(0.044) (0.044) (1.008) (0.542) (0.151) (0.384)
40 0.298*** 0.328*** –0.555 –0.124 0.028 –0.088
(0.035) (0.038) (0.667) (0.428) (0.105) (0.323)
75 0.116*** 0.115** 0.058 0.848 0.171** 0.627**
(0.04) (0.046) (0.402) (0.585) (0.071) (0.308)
90 0.176** 0.172* 1.086 0.672 0.243 0.478
(0.089) (0.09) (1.412) (0.819) (0.221) (0.516)
95 0.128 0.097 2.782 1.015 0.441 0.742
(0.108) (0.104) (2.716) (1.117) (0.298) (0.68)
F-test (weak IV) 0.828 2.362
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses while ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1% , 5% and 10% level respectively. 1This sample
does not include both quarters of 2001 due to a change in definition of a variable “firm size” in that year
the sample of provinces with too few respondents in some survey rounds. Hence, some
outliers might influence those insignificant results among the 5th and 10th percentiles
described in the previous section without affecting results of the more robust data from
these 32 provinces.10 Thus, wage compression effects of the minimum wage law among
these large firms could be stronger than what Table 5 suggests.
7 Discussion
The evidence for the impacts of minimum wages on wage inequality in Thailand suggests
that the wage compression effect is confined to only low-paid workers in the formal sec-
tor of the labor market (as classified by firm size). Although increases in the minimum
wage did not fully compensate for the rise in inflation after the Asian financial crisis, it
is shown that this is unlikely to be the major force behind the result. Specifically, even
in the years with a significant increase in real minimum wages, the impact of minimum
wages is still determined by market segmentation. Therefore, imperfect compliance with
the minimum wage law (not non-coverage11), especially in the informal sector, is the
most plausible factor driving this pattern. There are two explanations for the observed
high non-compliance rates. First, non-compliance could result from employers’ expecta-
tion on the cost of paying sub-minimum wages. As discussed in Section 2, despite the
relatively high upper limit of the fine and possible imprisonment for violating employers,
the probability of being caught and severely punished is literally zero. Thus, this weak
law enforcement is in line with the ineffective minimumwage policy observed. Moreover,
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Basu et al. (2007) show that such a weak enforcement of minimum wage policy can be
an equilibrium phenomenon for a government with a credibility problem under a model
with imperfect competition, imperfect enforcement and imperfect commitment.
On the other hand, the efficiency wage theory could explain higher compliance among
larger firms. Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) set up a simple efficiency wage model where
employers use dismissal as a disciplinary device to prevent shirking. Further, they assume
that the supervisory resources of firms are fixed and the firms’ capacity to closely
supervise is decreasing with the number of employees. Acknowledging skepticism of
monitoring difficulties as an explanation for employer size wage premia, Rebitzer and
Taylor (1995) refer to both theoretical and empirical studies which suggest that the mon-
itoring and incentive problem still persist in incentive schemes with minimal monitoring
difficulties such as the piece rate. So an increase in minimum wages raises the cost of
dismissal and induces workers in large firms to assert higher effort. Using the survey data
from the UK residential care homes industry after the introduction of the National Min-
imum Wage in 1999, Georgiadis (2013) finds the evidence that supports this efficiency
wage hypothesis.
Better compliance in large firms can be depicted from the data through kernel density
and cumulative distribution plots of log hourly wages in Figs. 3 and 4. The peak of wage
distribution in the formal sector (large firms) is around the highest provincial minimum
Fig. 3 The kernel density and cumulative distribution of log hourly wage (weighted) in Thailand for the
formal (Large firms) and the informal (SME) workers 3rd quarter 1994 VS 1995
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Fig. 4 The kernel density and cumulative distribution of log hourly wage (weighted) in Thailand for the
formal (Large firms) and the informal (SME) workers July 2007 VS 2008
wage in both 1995 and 2008, whereas the peak prevails among informal workers (employ-
ees in small and medium firms) after a strong surge in compliance rates of both sectors in
the 2000s.
It is worth noting that our discussion of the compliance problem and ineffectiveness
of minimum wage policy is consistent with the segmented labor market (or two-sector)
models such as Lewis (1954); Harris and Todaro (1970); Gramlich (1976); Mincer (1974)
and Welch (1974) in many aspects. First, wage compression effects happen only in the
formal sector with a single peak of the wage distribution around the legislative minimum
wage. Second, those informal workers in the covered sector do not appear to experience
any wage compression effects. Moreover, the legislative minimumwage does not generate
any spikes in the informal wage distribution except for some recent periods of expansion
in compliance. These observations are in accordance with the prediction of the Welch-
Gramlich-Mincer two-sector model if the formal sector is treated as a covered sector
while the informal one is treated as an uncovered sector.12 However, this conclusion is
opposed to many analyses in Latin America (such as Lemos 2009; Maloney 1998; Pratap
and Quintin 2006) which conclude that the two-sector model does not seem to correctly
predict the wage and employment effects of the minimum wage law in spite of a sizable
informal sector. Specifically, these papers find significant wage compression effects in
both formal and informal sectors but no adverse effects on employment.
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Nonetheless, since the employment effect of minimum wage law is beyond the scope of
this paper, it is not clear whether a significant fall in total employment as predicted by the
Welch-Gramlich-Mincer model will be found in Thai data. In order to explore such topic,
a more concrete definition of formal workers, which does not depend on being employed,
has to be adopted. In particular, without good employment history or panel data, it is
difficult or impossible to assign any unemployed workers to either large or small firms.
Otherwise, other proxies for the formal sector such as social security entitlement must
be used. The main challenge, however, is that the LFS data during these entire periods do
not contain such information.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of the minimum wage policy on wage inequality in
Thailand using the Labor Force Survey in the first and third quarters from 1985 to 2010.
The evidence suggests that the minimum wage does not significantly affect overall wage
distribution after allowing for different provincial trends. Despite restricting the sample
to the covered sector, the minimum wage does not help compress the lower part of wage
distribution towards the median. Conversely, it might widen wage gaps between the low-
est decile and the median, though such a result is not robust. The wage compression
effect is detected only after confining the sample to formal workers (classified by firm
size) in the covered sector. These findings are robust to different empirical strategies and
are not driven by small sample sizes in any provinces or periods. Hence, the difference in
compliance rate between the formal and informal sectors (not between the covered and
uncovered sectors) seems to be the prominent factor behind the fragmented effects of the
minimum wage policy on wage inequality.
As for policy implication, the weak law enforcement seems to partly sustain sub-
minimum pay among small firms in the covered sector. Without tackling the non-
compliance issue, minimum wages will not be effective in creating a wage floor for
low-paid workers in small firms (the informal sector), but might serve as another form of
collective wage setting between formal workers and their employers through regional tri-
partite sub-committees. Yet better enforcement and higher compliance could potentially
(but not always) lead to higher unemployment among low-paid workers.
In terms of theoretical models, the empirical results seem to coincide with the standard
two-sector model’s prediction. However, to draw any conclusion, sectoral employment
effects need to be verified. This is beyond the scope of this paper and requires additional
information to properly distinguish formal workers from their informal counterparts. In
addition, one possible extension of themodels is to incorporate the self-employed into the
analysis. Although the self-employed are not covered by the minimum wage, comparing
self-employed to uncovered workers as well as informal workers in the covered sector
could provide interesting findings.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the Thai government just implemented the largest two-
step minimum wage hikes in 2012 and 2013 which led to a single national minimum
wage at 300 baht per day.13 This movement coincides with a two-step reduction in
corporate income tax from 30% to 23% and from 23% to 20% on January 1, 2012 and
2013 respectively (excluding some small enterprises subject to a lower tax rate and foreign
businesses under the Board of Investment scheme). Although the government claims that
the main objective of corporate tax reduction is to increase businesses’ competitiveness
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in preparation for the beginning of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015,14
it is arguable that the tax reduction not only offers businesses (particularly in the formal
sector) some compensation for the minimum wage hikes but also weakens any resis-
tance of employers in the national tripartite committee.15 Such a parallel move could
provide an opportunity to assess impacts of the minimum wage on employment and
wage distribution among different segments of the Thai labor market, particularly any
disparities between large and small firms in the covered sector.
Endnotes
1There is an exception for some hazardous jobs as defined by the Ministry of Labor
(such as jobs related to work under water, inside tunnels, or involving hazardous
chemicals or radioactive materials). Employees in these jobs are not allowed to work
more than seven hours per regular working day. Yet this paper disregards such an
exception and transforms the minimum wage per day into an hourly rate by dividing the
statutory minimum wage per day by eight.
2The sample size of employees for the whole country in the third round ranges from
13,313 (out of a total of 78,214 persons) in 1985 to 37,828 (177,821) in 1994 and 53,342
(219,538) in 2007.
3This bias results from a spurious correlation between the variables (Borjas 1980). In
this case, the median of the observed log wage (potentially measured with errors) is used
on both sides of the regression equation.
4Bindingness percentiles of provincial minimum wages of the second and third
sub-samples are available upon request.
5The results from OLS regressions of the other two sub-samples also suffer from the
division bias problem. Thus, they will not be shown.
6Weak instruments is one of the major concerns for 2SLS regression. The last row of
Table 3 presents the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic for a weak identification test of
the first-stage regression in each column. The F-statistics are the same for every
percentile because the same set of endogenous regressors and instrumental variables is
employed. These F-statistics in Tables 3 and 4 are significantly larger than the
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10% (Stock and Yogo 2005). Hence, weak
instruments is not an issue for the 2SLS estimations of all employees and the sub-sample
of male private employees outside agriculture.
7At the 5% significance level, the wage compression effect also extends to the 10th
percentile of the males only.
8Although the F-statistic for first-stage regression of 2SLS without provincial trends is
too low to reject the null hypothesis of weak identification, the first-stage regression of
2SLS with provincial trends does have a significantly high F-statistic.
9In addition, there is a robust negative and significant result (at the 5% level) for the
75th percentile of sub-sample male private employees. It implies that the change in
wages from 1994 to 1995 for this specific percentile is smaller in the province with a
higher fraction of workers affected by the minimum wage. Unless there exist significant
spillover effects or measurement errors in wages per hour (Autor et al. 2010), this
interpretation is at odds with the fact that the binding of the minimum wage in any
provinces does not exceed the 65th percentile for this sub-sample in those periods.
Hence, I decide not to discuss this counter-intuitive sign of coefficients in this paper.
10However, the insignificant Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics for all 2SLS in
Tables 10 and 11 raise a concern about weak identification of instrumental variables.
This might be a result of restricting the sample to just 32 out of 76 provinces. All in all,
the weak identification problem does not invalidate the whole results because models
based on the predicted median still consistently provide supporting evidence for the
same conclusion.
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11Unlike developed countries, where non-coverage can be one of the major concerns,
developing countries seems to suffer more from non-compliance even in the covered
sector (Strobl and Walsh 2003).
12Though median wages of the informal sector in the data are lower than in its formal
counterpart, the Gramlich-Mincer version of the model does not unambiguously predict
the direction of wage in the uncovered (or informal) sector after the minimum wage is
imposed (Brown 1999).
13On April 1, 2012, in order to push the minimum wage in provinces with the highest
band to 300 baht per day, minimum wages in every province were raised by
approximately 40%. Then on January 1, 2013, minimum wages in the rest of the country
were lifted to 300 baht per day. This resulted in almost doubling minimum wages among
provinces in the lowest minimum wage band.
14Alexander, S., Salze-Lozac’h, V., & Winijkulchai, A.: Thailand adopts nationwide
minimum wage policy amid controversy, Asia Foundation, January 30, 2013.
15Parker, J.: Thailand introduces nationwide minimum wage, The Diplomat, January
11, 2013.
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